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36TII CONGRESS,
2d Session.

l HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 5 REPORT C. C.
l No. 259.

S

JOHN P. BALDWIN.
DECEMBER

18, 1860.-Reported from the Court of Claims, committed to a Committee of the
Whole House, and ordered to be printed.

To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States in Congress assembled :

The Court of Claims respectfully presents the following documents
as the report in the case of

JOHN P. BALDWIN vs. THE UNITED STATES.
1. The petition of the claimant.
2. Petition to Congress and accompanying papers, referred by
the Senate to the Court of Claims, transmitted to the Senate.
3. Depositions of William Cooley and Charles Horne, filed in the
Court of Claims by claimant on the 30th day of October, 1858 ; also,
d~posi.tions of William H. Wall, William Rigby, William Cooley,
and Alexander Patterson, filed in the Court of Claims by claimant,
March 19, 1850, transmitted to the Senate.
4. Claimant's brief.
5. Solicitor's brief.
6. Opinion of the court adverse to the claim .

. By order of the Court of Claims.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
[L
]
seal of said court, at Washington, this 11th day of Decem. 8·
ber, A. D. 1860.
SAM'L H. HUNTINGTON,
Ohi~f Clerk Oourt of Olaims.

To the honorable the Judges of the Court of Claims :
The petition of John P. Baldwin, a citizen, late of Dade county,
now of Monroe, in the State of Florida, respectfully represents: That
in the latter part of the year 1835 a Spanish brig, called the Gil
Blas, was wrecked on the Florida beach, about 35 miles northward of
Cape Florida; that a short time after she was sold at auction at Key
West, with her cargo, as she lay on the beach, and was purchased by
your petitioner; that early in the year 1836 the said brig and her
cargo was set fire to and consumed by the naval officers of the govern-
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ment, in order to prevent the possibility of said schooner and cargo
fallino- into the hands of the Indians, with whom the government was
then ~t war; that the said cargo consisted of the following articles:
6 tons oflead, valued at ...............................................
5 tons of kentledge .... ... .. . . . . .. . .. .... .. . . . . .. ... .. . . . . . .. .. . ... ... .. .
·30 water casl{s .. . ... ... ... ... ............ ... ...... ... ... . .. . . . . .. ... .. .. ..
2 chain cables.............................................................
3 anchors...................... .. .. . .. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . .. .. . . . . .. .. .. . . .
Hull, sails, and rigging................................................

$480
100
75
300
75
170

00
00
00
00
00
00

1,200 00
Your petitioner further represents that the destruction of the said
brig and cargo for the " public good" is fully set forth in the declaration made on the 26th of July, 1836, by rrhomas Leib and George
Clark, lieutenants in the United States navy, hereto annexed, and the
value of the same is shown by the depositions of witnesses, taken under
the order of the district judge of the Territory of Florida, to be found
in the papers referred by the Senate of the United States to this court.
Your petitioner further represents that if the s9.id property had not
thus been destroyed he would have been able to save the same, and
to have realized by his purchase more than the amount at which the
said articles are valued, and. that he was at the time saving said
articles, and that by reason of the act aforesaid the said articles have
become wholly lost to him.
Your petitioner stateij that. this claim was presented to the Senate
the 1st session of the 2gth Congress; that an adverse report, No. 58,
was made at that Congress, but the same was recommitted,- and a
favorable report, No. 202, made. That on the 3d of August, 1846,
11th of February, 1848, and 30th of June, 1856, the said claim was
also favorably reported on by the Senate committees, and that at the
present session the same was referred bv resolution of the Senate to
this honorable court.
·
Your petitioner further represents that he is the sole owner of the
claim, and he prays that a bill may be reported in his favor for the
amount herein stated, together with the interest due thereon.
P. PHILLIPS, Solicitor for Petitioner.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 8th day of February, 1858.
WM. MARIM, United States Judge.
JOHN P. BALDWIN.

TERRITORY OF FLORIDA, COUNTY OF DADE,

Indian Key, July 26, 1836.
We, the undersigned, thinking it best for the public good, did set
fire to the brig Gil Blas, that she might become coveted with sand
and that all traces of her might be destroyed, to prevent the Indian~
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ever getting from her any lead or other articles which would be of
any UEe to them.
JAMES M. ARMSTRONG,
Master of U.S. schooner Mottu.

THOS. J. LEIB,
Lieutenant United States Navy.
I also certify that I was present at the burning of said brig Gil
Blas, and that there was on board of said brig her chain cables and
two anchors.
GEORGE CLARK, United Stat~s Navy.

IN 'rHE COURT OF CLAIMS.
JOHN

P.

BALDWIN

vs.

THI!J UNITED STATES.

The evidence shows that, in the latter part of 1835, the Spanish
brig Gil Blas was wrecked off the coast of Florida ; that she was sold
at auction at Key West as she lay stranded on the beach, and that
the claimant became the purchaser.
That' the officers of the United States, " thinking it best for the
public good, did set fire to said brig, that she might be covered with
sand, and that all traces of her might be destroyed, to prevent the
Indians ever getting from her lead or other articles which would be
of any use to them. (See certificates, p. 4.)
This certificate was given by Lieut. Lieb-"to be forwarded to John
P. Ba.Id win, the owner"-to Charles Howe, at the time deputy collector of the customs at Key West . . (Dep. of Howe, p. 23.)
'J.lo ascertain the damage done to him, Baldwin filed his petition
in the district court of the United States, praying that, for the ascertainment of what indemnity was justly due from the government,
appraisers should be appointed.
This was done, and the return of the appraisers showed the loss to
be $1,200. (p. 8.) The depositions of Peter Scott and William
Cooley (pp. 6 and 7) accompany this report. Scott is shown to be
dead, and Cooley has been examined in this case. (p. 23.)
In this latter examination he refers, for value of the different articles,
to his answers to the interrogatories made by him soon after the
burning of said brig.
In addition to these, we have also the deposition of Wade. S Rigby,
(p. 9,) that the brig and cargo could have been brought to Key West;
that the Indian hostilities would not have prevented this ; and that
the burning of the brig occasioned the loss of the indestructible
articles, as they were covered up by the shifting sands, and thus all
trace of their locality lost.
This is also confirmed by the depositions of George Aldersdale, (p.
10,) Capt. N. L. Coste, (pp. 10, 11,) and William Rigby, (p. 19.)
'l1 he case as made by the evidence shows that the property of the
petitioner was destroyed for the public good by the authorized agents
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of the ~overnmerit, and the public treasure must make compensation.
(See 2 Kent's Com., p. 339, and notes.)
It can make no difference as to the liability that the property was
destroyed and not used by the government.
A vessel may be taken from the owner in time of war, w~en the
public interest demands it ; or it may be destroyed to prevent it~ falling into the hands of the enemy. In the one case, as well ~s 1~ the
other, there is an individual loss, and a publfo use, in the constitutional
sense, which entitle the party to a just compensation.

P. PHILLIPS,
Solicitor for Petitioner.
JUNE

9, 1859.

JOHN P. BALDWIN vs. THE UNITED STATES.
SOLICITOR'S BRIEF.

Claim for the loss of property on board of a stranded vessel in Florida,
which vessel was burnt, by order of a naval offectr, to prevent such
property falling info the hands of the Indian,fJ during the wa1· with
them in 1836.
MATERIAL FACTS AS UNDERSTOOD BY THE SOLICITOR.

First. The plaintiff claims that -h e was the owner of the Spanish
brig Gil Blas and the property on board of her.
Second. That the brig was stranded on the eastern coast of Florida,
near New River, about thirty-five miles northward of Cape Florida,
from two to three hundred miles from Key West, in the fall of 1835.
(Rigby's ev., Record, p. 19.)
Third. That said brig had on board when she stranded a quantity
of lead, supposed to be six tons ; also a quantity of kentledge; but her
sails and rigging, or most of them, with some lead, were taken to
Key West. (Cooley's statement, Record, p. 7.)
Fourth. That said brig was not bilged, and she could have been
readily extricated from the beach, and, with her cargo, taken to Key
West, and the owner could have employed the Florida wreckers to
have helped him. (Rigby's statP.ment, Record, p. 9.)
Ooste says: "This one (wreck Gil Blas) could readily have been
saved and brought to this port (Key West) had the wreckers have
been there at th~ time." (Record, p. 11.)
Fifth. "That the said brig was sold at Key West, at public outcry,
in the month of December, 1835," to plaintiff. (Rigby's statement,
Record, p. 9.)
Cooley says: "That during said year she (the brig Gil Blas) was
sold at auction at Key West, by order of her captain, as she laid on
the beach." (Record, p. 7.)
Sixth. Plaintiff claims to have acquired his title by purchase, at
public auction, in December, 1835.
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"I became the owner of the brig and a part of her cargo by purchase, at public auction, in December, 1835, and I immediately begun
to make preparations to bring them to this port, (Key West.) The
major part of the cargo had been saved by wreckers before the sale."
(Record, p; 16.)
Seventh. The plaintiff saved a portion of his purchase.
The plaintiff says: "I immediately commenced making preparations to save my property, and secured and brought some of it to this
place, (Key West;) but in consequence of cold weather and the prevailing winds, some little delay occurred in obtaining wreckers to go
up to her." (Record, p. 17.)
Eighth. That on the 26th of July, 1836, some eight months after
said plaintiff claims to have purchased said brig and her cargo, she
was burnt, by direction of an officer of the navy, to preve1J.t the lead
and other articles on board being taken by the Indians.
Lieb and Armstrong, of the navyJ certify to William Cooley, under
date of July 26, 1836, as follows:
"Sm: We, the undersigned, thinking it best for the public good,
did set fire to the brig Gil Blas, that she might become covered with
sand, and that all traces of her might be destroyed, to prevent the
Indians ever getting from her any lead or any other articles which
would be of any use to them." (Record, p. 7.)
Ninth. What articles were taken from the wreck by the wreckers
for the captain and owners is not shown, nor does it appear that they
took away and carried to Key West for the plaintiff is not proved.
Tenth. The proof does not show what particular articles or what
quantity were on board of the brig when she was burnt, though the
officers destroying her understood there was lead and some other
articles on board.
Eleventh. There is .no evidence that the plaintiff, for months previous to .the burning, had been taking any measures to save the vessel
or to remove her cargo. Both seem to have been abandoned.
Twelfth. The wreckers employed by plaintiff were, in fact, driven
off by the Indians.
. From the plaintiff's own statement, (Record, p. 17,) it seems he
sent wreckers to the vessel, but they were delayed in starting by the
cold weather and winds. It is fair to presume that they went as soon
as it became a little warmer. A party did go, and they abandoned
the work on account of the presence of Indians.
Gooley testifies: "l was employed by John P. Baldwin to get the
vessel off and save the cargo. When in the act, witness's family
were all murdered by the Indians while residing about nine miles
from the vessel ; and in consequence of the hostile Indians being so
thick on the coast and in the vicinity of the brig, had to abandon the
work and discharge a large number of men that I had employed by
order of John P. Baldwin." (Record, p. 23.)
Thirteenth. There is no evidence that the plaintiff made any further
effort to save the vessel or cargo.
Fourteenth. There is no evidence of the value of the property on
board at the time of the burning, situated as it was in the Indian
country, and so distant from Key West.
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Fifteenth. There is no vidence what plaintiff paid for the wreck
and her cargo, or that he, in fact, paid anything .
St'xfeenth. There is no evidence that the wreck and cargo were sold
by order of any court having jurisdiction thcm~of.
Seventeenth. There is no evidence that the captain had any power
or authority to make sale of the wreck or cargo ; nor is there proof
that the person referred to as captain was really such captain.
E?°ghteenth. The plaintiff produces no bill of sale; nor does he
prove any deli very of the property he claims ; nor any that he, in
fact, paid anything whatever for it.
Nineteenth. There jg no evidence that there was a necessity for the
captain selling ; but, on the contrary, the proof is clear that there
was no such necessity at the time of the ntranding in 1835.
Rigby says: "Furthermore, this deponent saith that said property
could all have been saved had she not have been destroyed." (Record,
p. 19.)
Simonton says: '' It was not anticipated that the hull could be _got
afloat, but all the other articles could have been saved without difficulty by the wreckers if she h~d been let alone by the navy officers."
(Record, p. 18.)
The plaintiff said: "1'hat I could and would have saved them,
(the vessel and cargo,) that I had the means of so doing, and that
they were safe and secure on the beach, and might have remained so
for a great length of time had it not been thus destroyed, must be
abundantly evident from the depositions annexed, and from the fact
that I had, after my purchase, and before she was burnt, saved a
portion of the cargo," &c. (Record, p. 17.)
Rigby says: "She (the brig) could have been readily extricated
from the beach, and with her cargo brought to this port "
"The owners might have saved the brig with ease, and everything
in and on her, had she not been thus destroyed." (Record, p. 9.)
Twentieth. That it appears from the evidence that when the vessel
was first stranded she and her cargo could have been saved, and the
cargo was mostly saved; but that afterwards, when the Indians became numerous and troublesome, they could not be saved, and were
not, but were abandoned by the agent of the plaintiff.
LEGAL PROPOSITIONS.
FIRST. The plaintfff shows no sufficient evidence of title to either the
vessel or cargo.

The plaintiff's claim rests exclusively upon an alleged sale at Key
West, by the captain, of the vessel and cargo, which were not present,
but were some two or three hundred miles distant, and which was
made without delivery or bill of sale, and without proof of consideration, and without proof of any power or authority conferred upon the
captain by the owners of either the vessel or cargo. To the validity
of such a sale there are several objections :
1. There was no bill of sale.
A bill of sale, by the maritime law, is necessary to transfer a ahip
or vessel.

JOHN P. BALDWIN.
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In Weston vs. Pinniman, (1 Mason, 306, p. 316,) Judge Story said:
"To be sure a bill of sale is necessary to pass the title of a ship.
But this does not depend upon any enactment peculiar to our muni. cipal law, but it grows out of the general maritime law, which requires
such a document as a proper muniment, of title of the ship."
In the case of the Two Sisters, (5 C. Robinson, 155, p. 159,) Sir
William Scott said: '' According to the ideas which I have al ways
entertained on this question, a bill of sale is the proper title, to which
the maritime courts of all countries would look. It is the uniVfffsal
instrument of transfer of ships in the usage of all maritime countries,
and in no degree a peculiar title deed or conveyance known only to
the law of England.''
2. The property sold was not present, and no delivery is proved to
have been made.
The evidence shows that the property was some fifteen miles from
New River, and thirty:-five north of Cape Florida, which was some
two or three hundred miles northeast from Key West, where the sale
is claimAcl to have been made, and no delivery was or could have been
made at the latter place.
Delivery, actual or constructive, is clearly necessary to pass title.
We are not to consider the effect of a bill of sale, because none is
proved. 'I.1his is a case of a sale of a ship and cargo hundreds of miles
away, where no bill of sale was given and no delivery was made, .so
that there was neither actual nor constructive delivery; and, without
the one. or the other, no title could pass. No court has held that the
title can pass when there was neither bill of sale nor delivery.
3. There is no evidence that the plaintiff paid any consid6ration for
the assumed purchase of said vessel and cargo.
In addition to the defects above suggested, that there was neither
bill of sale nor delivery, the plaintiff does not show that he paid any
consideration whatever, without which the title would not pass; there
is not an allusion in the evidence that anything was paid, much less
how much. The plaintiff may have bid for the vessel and cargo, and
the same have been struck down to him in the presence of the witnesses, and they may have deemed this a sale. But clearly it would
not constitute a sale. The witness swears to a conclusion of law, instead of swearing to the facts, to enable the court to determine whether
there was a sale or not. There is an entire omission of all facts from
which the court can come to the conclus ion that there was a sale.
Without a bill of sale or delivery, or consideration proved, the court
cannot say that there was a sale.
In the absence of these facts, there is no evidence which would bar
a claim by the owners, should they demand compensation for this same
ves~el ~nd cargo .. _There is not enough shown to prove a transfer of
their rights, even 1f the master had the undoubted right to sell.
In Hozey vs. Buchanan, (16 Pet., 215, p. 220,) the Supreme Court
h_eld: "But the charge that 'a bill of sale, accompanied by possess10~,' constituted a good title in law, is liable to objection. That such
a~ 1_nstrument connected with the possession is prima facie evidence
of right may be admitted; but in the view of the evidence in the case,

8

JOlIN P. BALDWIN.

there should have been the qualification that the transfer was bona
fide and for a valuable consideration."
I~ the present case there was no bill of sale, no deli very of possession,
nor proof of consideration.
.
.
.
4. It is not shown that the captam had any authority to sell either
ship or carg0. ·
There is no evidence that the master was clothed with any express
authority by the owners to sell either .. Nor is there any that any
court adjudicated the sale. Nor does 1t appear that a survey was
made by the proper persons to consider, advise, or determine as to
the propriety of such sale, as is required by the maritime law in all
cases where practicable, as it is shown to havE been in this case.
There is no proof that there was a necessity for a sale; but, on the
contrary, the plaintiff has shown that, at the time of the stranding,
and for some time afterwards, the vessel and cargo might both have
been saved, although, when Cooley abandoned them, it had become
impracticable on account of the Indians.
It is well settled that the master of a vessel has no power to sell a
ship or cargo except in cases of absolute and extreme necessity, to be
clearly shown.
Abbott; in his treatise, says: "That in extreme cases, and in extreme cases only, he (the master) had the power to sell, as in the
instance of a wreck which could not be got off, and ought not to be
left to perish absolutely.''
In The .American Ins. Co. vs. Centre, (4 Wen., 45, pp. 51, 52,) Walworth, Chancellor, said: "I know of no principle which can authorize the abandonment of a vessel, either in port or elsewhere, merely
because materials cannot be had there to make full repairs. · If the
ship is not injured to a moiety of her value, it is the duty of the
master to make her seaworthy, and to proceed on the voyage."
"The master is not authorized to se~l the ship or cargo except in a
case of absolute necessity, when he 1s not in a situation to consult
with his owner, anJ when the preservation of the property makes it
necessary for him to act as the agent of whom it may concern."
In the present case, the plaintiff himself expressly refers to the
vessel and cargo after his purchase: " That I could have saved them,
that I had the means of so doing, and that they were safe and secure
on the beach, and might have remained so for a great length of time
had it not been destroyed, must be abundantly evident," &c. (Record, p. 17.)
In Uordon vs. Mass. F. &; M. Ins. Go., (2 Pick., 249, pp. 262-'3-'4,)
Parker, Ch. J., reviews the cases on th~ subject of the captain's
power. He states the case where a s~rvey is necessary, and urges its
propriety, and quotes with approbat10n the opinion of Chief Justice
Dallas in Ide vs. Exch. Ass. Uo., (3 Moore,) which is as follows:
"'l'he right to sell, as between the captain and owners, has been
-deemed of a very questionable nature; althouo-h upon the whole
extract!ng from the ?ooks w bat seems to be _the°weight of authority:
I conceive that the right to s8ll must be considered to exist in cases of
-extreme necessity. A right, however, which in all cases must be
strictly watched.''
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In Hall vs. Franklin Ins. Oo., (9 Pick., 466,) it was held: That
"the necessity which will justify the master of a ship in selling her
is one in which he has no opportunity to consult the owners or
ins1uers, and which leaves him no alternative."
Kent (3 v., 173,) says: "But if the voyage is broken up in the
course of it by ungovernable circumstances, the master, in that case,
may even sell the ship or cargo, provided it be done in good faith, ~
for the good of all concerned, and in a case of supreme necessity,
which sweeps all ordinary rules before it. The merely acting in good
faith and for the interest of all concerned is not sufficient to exempt ·
the sale of goods from the character of a tortuous conversion, for
which the ship-owner and the purchaser are responsible, if the absolute
necessity of the sale be not clearly made out. Nor will the sanction
of the vice-admiralty court aid the sale when the requisite necessity
is wanting. All the cases are decided and peremptory, and upon the
soundest principles, in the call for that necessity."
The same rules are laid down in Curtis's Rights and Duties of
Merchant Seamen, pp. 186 to 189.
In the case of the schooner Tilton (5 Mason, 465,) Judge Story
held: "The master of a ship has not, in virtue of his office, any
authority to sell a ship, except in cases of extreme necessity, where
the vessel is wrecked or ungovernable, &c. If he sells without such
necessity, the sale is invalid, notwithstanding he acted in good faith,
at least where the contest is between the owner and purchaser."
In the present case there was no necessity of a sale. 'rhe plaintiff
disproves this necessity, and shows that the vessel and cargo both
might have been saved and taken to Key West; and both the captain
and he did take a large portion of the cargo from the vessel to that
place. If a part of the cargo could be saved, the presumption is
undoubted that the whole might have been. The plaintiff himself
states, and then proves, that both vessel and cargo could have been
got off and taken to Key West. This being so, the captain was
under no necessity of selling, and consequently had no power to sell.
If he had no power to sell, he could convey no title. It follows that
the plaintiff took no title, and now has none to the property for which
he claims pay .
. It is no answer to say that the owner is not here contesting his
right. He may come, and might do so after payment to the plaintiff.
The facts now proved would show the property to be his; and if any
one 1s to be paid, it should be him. It is an answer to the plaintiff
when his evidence shows that he has no title against the owner. He
can then have none against any one else.
SECOND. The proceedings in the matter oj the appraisal of the damages
sustained by the plaintijf m·e no evidence of such damages.

These proceedings are found from pages 6 to 9 in the record, and
have no more legal validity than the like statement from any other
pe_rsons. The judge was not authorized to appoint persons to ascerta1~ t_be amount of loss sustained. The petition shows that the
plamt1ff asked for the appraisement, with the view of making the
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United States liable, without giving them notice or allowing them to
be heard.
Scott, one of the witnesses, who had been a sailor on the Gil Blas,
swore to what was on the vessel at some time, but does not state
when, and does not assert that he knew what was on board at the
time of the burning. He does not mention that there was lead on
board.
Cooley says that it was said that there were six tons of lead on board.
He also states that "her sails and rigging-, or most of them, and
· about 400 pounds of lead, were brought to Key West previous to the
burning." (Record, p. 7.)
Neither of these witnesses give the value of any article on board.
Still, Wall and Patterson assume to fix prices of articles which th~y
had not seen nor heard valued, and the condition of which they did
not inquire into, and did not know. They did not ascertain whether
the articles could br removed, or at what expense. The witness did
not furnish them any data on which to make up the valuation presented. They were not authorized by law to do what they did.
· Again: There is no legal evidence of this assumed appraisal. The
certificate of the county clerk, if genuine, is no evidence of the facts
stated in it. His certificate does not prove that the papers were
genuine originals, or that the witnesses had signed and swore to the
papers, or that the judge had signed the order. These papers are no
evidence of anything here, ncr is there proof that they would be even
in Florida. This court can only receive as evidence papers certified
in conformity to a law of Congress, or the rules of the common law,
authenticated in the manner pointed out in treatises on evidence.
THIRD.

There is no evidencefr(Jm which damage8 can be computed.

The evidence does not show that the witnesses had a1.1y personal
knowledge of the quantity of lead or pig iron on board, and they
could not have known. No witness affixed any value to one of the
articles said to be on board the vessel. The court cannot, from the
evidence, determine the quantity or the value, at the place where the
vessel lay, of the things on board. The size and weight of the anchors
are not given. Neither the length nor weight of the cables is specified,
nor the size or quantity of sail or rigging. No evidence is given of
the value of the water casks. There is no proof of the value of these
things at Key West or other port, nor what it would have cost to
take them out of the vessel and transport them to a market . . Nor
is a value fixed upon them at the place where they lay. Nor is it
shown that they could have been sold for a dollar at that place. Nor
is there any evidence of the state and condition of one of these articles,
nor reason given by the witneBses why these things were left behind,
when the sails and rigging, or most of them, and a part of the leu.d,
were taken away and carried to Key West.
From the materials found in evidence in this record, no one can
tell what damage the plaintiff has sustained, if any, by the burning
of the Vt::ssel. The iron, anchors, and cables could not have been
injured by burning the ve sel, and the lead is not shown to have been
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melted or otherwise injured. No effort is shown to remove these
things after the hull of the vessel was burnt, although it is quite
apparent that they could have been more easily removed after than
before the burning, and must have remained so until storms and winds·
moved the sands where the vessel lay and covered up what remained
unconsumed. This is not likely soon to have occurred after the burning in July. It is observable that the two witnesses, Oooley and
Howe, who were sworn on interrogatories, although inquired of, were
unable to affix any value to the things destroyed. (Record, pp.
·22,23.)
FoURTH. It was the fa.ult of the plaintiff that he did not secure the
articles uninJured by the fire before they became totally lost, and his
omission to do so itJ a bar to a recovery for them.

The burning seems to have been done about the 25th of July, 1836.
The wrecker (Cooley) emploied by the plaintiff was present, and
p~loted the "Motto" up to the place where the Gil Blas lay. He
did not object to the burnino-,
nor intimate that anything more could .
0
b~ profitably saved. Howe seems to have bad some special relations
with the plaintiff, as he took a certificate of the burning to forward
t~ him, (Record; p. 23;) and it is _to be presumed that it ~as immediately sent to him. But no effort was made by the plaintiff, nor by
Howe or Cooley in his behalf, to save the property which remained
undestroyed. There is no evidence when the wreck became covered
with sand ; nor is there any that there were blows or storms soon
after, which would be likely to cover her. There is no evidence that
. the plaintiff ever went there in search of his property, or sent there
to see if anything could be saved. He seems to have made no effort
":hatever to save what remained uninjured. The next we hear of
him he is preparing to make a claim against the United States for
the property claimed, and is preparing and obtaining an ex parte
valuation of it .
. 'l'he United States, if accountable for the burning, are not respon. s1ble for the loss that may have resulted from his abandoning that
part of his property which might have been saved by making proper
exertions. They could only be called upon to indemnity him for the
destruction of such of his property as the fire destroyed, and not to
pay for such as remained uninjured, and might have been sav.ed by
proper exertions.
FIFTH. At the time of the burning of the vessel the property had been
abandoned upon territory of the United States, and therefore they are
not liable for destroying it.

r_i;he territory where the Gil Blas was stranded belonged to the
U~nted States, and they had a lawful right to control it. Property
lrrng there in an apparent derelict state for a long period they had a
r1g~t to treat as abandoned; and, if abandoned, to use or destroy it.
This vessel was stranded in the fall of 1835, and her cargo had been
nearly all taken away by the wreckers for the use of themselves as
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salvors and for the owners. At a subsequent period the sails and
rigging, or most of them, and some lead, were taken away, and then
the vessel laid wholly unprotected until the next July. This is conclusive proof of abandonment . There is not a particle of evidence
that the plaintiff, at the . time of the burning, contemplated the getti~g
off the hull or removing any more of the rigging or cargo. All laid
there a p~rfect derelict and wholly abandoned. Under such circumstances, the United States had a right to take possession and use ?r
destroy. Abandonment is determined, not by what the party may m
fact intend, but by his acts, which others can see and observe, a°:d
from which they alone can act ; and, when it has once taken place, it
cannot be recalled.
SIXTH. q the plaint?°_ff became the purchaser of a foreign ve~sel and
cargo on board, the presumption is that the latte1· was a foreign
duction; and if so, was subJect to du,ties, for which the plaintiff is
responsible; and not having been paid, the same was forfeited to the
United Stales.

r·~-

The act of the ~d of March, 1825, (4 U. S. L., 133,) section 2d,
provides:
" That all property, of every description whatsoever, which shall
be taken from any wreck from the sea, or from any of the keys or
shoals within the jurisdiction of the United States on the co~st _of
Florida, shall be brought to some port of entry within the junsdiction aforesaid ; '' that is, '' in any court of the United States or Territories thereof having competent jurisdiction," as specified in the
first section.
Who may be wreckers is provided by the act of 23d May, 1828,
(4 U.S. L., 292.)
The act of March 1, 1823, (5 U. S. L., 736, § 21,) requires all
goods taken from wrecks to be regularly appraised, with reference to
the payment of duty.
Where the goods a.re raised from a vessel that has been sunk t_wo
years "in any river, harbor, bay, or waters" within the jurisdiction
of the United States, and has been abandoned by the owner, they
may be entered free of duty. (5 U. S. L., 609.)
If the plaintiff owned imported goods, he was bound, under the
general law, to report and enter them at the nearest custom-house,
and pay duty thereon.
,
By the then law, (4 U. S. L., 587,) the duty on anchors made ot
iron was two cents, and on cables three cents per pound, and on iron
in pigs fifty cents per hundred and twelve pounds. The duty on lead
in pigs and bars was three cents per pound. There were also duties
on manufactures of hemp and woad. If accurately ascertained upon
all the articles now claimed to have been destroyed, these duties
would probably amount to near or quite as much as the present claim.
There is no evidence that the duty on these articles was ever paid,
nor that there were any steps taken towards making an entry. This
not having been done, the goods became forfeited to the United States,
and they ceased to be the property of the plaintiff. They became
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forfeited by the omissions of the party. The rights o~ the United
States became perfect without an adjudication in an admiral~y court,
which would have been nothing more than indisputable evidence of
the forfeiture, which is now proved in another way,_ but one equally
as effectual. The question of forfeiture is now triable, when the
plaintiff claims to be owner. He cannot be owner if the goods have
been forfeited under a statute; and, if not the owner, then h~ cannot
have sustained damages by the destruction of what was not his.
SEVENTH • .As the brig Gil Blas and he1· cargo were situated, under
circi,mstances which existed in Florida, the United States were authorized
to destroy both to lceep themfromfalling into the hands of the enemy.

The plaintiff has not shown that either the vessel or cargo was in
. his possession, or under his control, at the time of the burning. But,
on the contrary, the last time that he, through his agent, Cooley,
attempted to rescue and save the cargo, the Indians, by their violence
and murders, put an end to the enterprise, and it was given up and
abandoned. There is no evidence that the effort to save the goods
was ever renewed. The plaintiff yielded to the adverse circumstances
which surrounded the matter, and made no further effort.
We know from history, as well as from this record, that an Indian
war existed in Florida, and that this part of it was in the possession
and under the control of the Indians at that time. The Gil Blas was
stranded opposite and near to the ce·ntre of the Everglades, fro:n
which our troops could not drive them. There the brig lay, after
h~ving taken from her the valuabJe part of her cargo, sails, and riggmg, and everything that seemed to be worth incurring the expense
of saving. Both t.he government and the plaintiff knew of this state
of thing.a. To prevent the Indians from supplying themselves with
lead to aid in prosecuting the war, the United States officers went
fro1? ~e! West to the place where the vessel lay, being pilot:d by the
plamtrff s agent or employe, and set :fire to the vessel, which could
not have been saved at that time. Lieutenant Lieb states that he and
others, in the summer of 1836, "found the brig Gil Blas on shore
about Cape Florida, said to have on board several tons of lead, and,
apprehensive she might be found by the Indians, we burnt her ; that
the party could not at that time have saved the brig." (Record,
p. 15._) He adds, that he could form no opinion of the inventory or
appra1sement, nor the claim therein made.
It is clear that they found her as a derelict, not in possession of any
one; and that he did not see the property mentioned in the inventory,
and had only heard of the lead said to be on board.
~he plaintiff, if the owner, had left this property in a condition
which was dangerous, with reference to the war and the enemy, without p~oviding against its being converted into an instrument of destr~t10n. .F inding it in that condition, the officers of the United
&ates stationed on that coast to aid in ending the war were in duty
~ound to_ destroy it. These officers judged of the necessity, and there
is ~o ev1?ence that they did not judge honestly and rightly, even if
their decision could be now reviewed. It was not taking private
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property for public use; but it was simply preventing private property,
if it remained such, being taken by the public enemy to be used
against private citizens and against the government. These officers
had a right to destroy the property to prevent these consequences.
EIGHTH. · If the C?fficers who burnt the brig were not authorized so to
do as a part of their official duty, then they, ond not the United States,
are liable.

If the destruction of the brig was legal, then plaintiff has no just
cause of complaint; but if it was illegal, his remedy is against those
who committed the illegal act. rrhe United States are not responsiqle
for the torts or illegal acts of its officers not in the line of their duty.
They act by their agents, and only authorize them to perform lawful
acts. When they .go out of the line of their duty and do what is
illegal, they alone are responsible for what they do. There is no law
authorizing an officer to perform an illegal act.
NIN'FH. This case does not arise under any law of Congress, or rule
of a department, or contra-ct, express or implied, ond therefore the
plaintiff cannot recover.
·

There exists no law under which the plaintiff can recover. It is
not within the cases where this court can determine that damages can
be awarded. If it was a case of taking private property for public
use, still, without legislation to carry the Constitution into effect, this
court cannot award damages under it. Congress alone can prescribe
the mode of action, and clothe the court with the power of executing
the Constitution. That instrument addresses itself to t.he legislature,
and the latter must provide for the execution of the Constitution. The
government may take property, but it is for Congress to provide for
the payment. No such provision has been made in this case. This
court cannot supply for the defective action or omission of the legislature. It can only declare the rights that exist under present laws;
and if there are none provided in this case, then it must so declare,
and leave the party to go to Congress, which alone can make a law
to confer the right now claimed.

R. H. GILLErr,
Solicito1·.

Dated June 11, 1859.
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IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

June 14, 1860.
JOHN

P.

BALDWIN

vs.

THE UNITED STATES.

LORING, J., delivered the opinion of the court.
This case was referred to this court by an order of the Senate, made
January 11, 1858.
The facts are, that in 1835 the Spanish brig Gil Blas was wrecked
on the beach of Florida, about twenty miles north ward of Cape Florida,
and was shortly after, with her appurtenances and cargo, sold at auction at Key West oy her captain, and purchased by the petitioner, who
proceeded to take possession of her, and employed persons to remove
from her her equipment and contents. She had on board of her a
quantity of lead, iron, ballast, anchors and chains, sail rigging, and
water casks.
In 1836 she was burned by the officers of the United States to prevent the lead and other contents of the vessel from falling into the
hands of the Indians, with whom the country was then at war.
'l'he vessel and her contents were thus lost to the petitioner, who
claims an indemnity for his private property taken for public use.
It is objected that he does not prove title. But the vessel, her
appurtenances and cargo, were purchased by the petitioner at public
auction, (p. 12,) and he was in possession of her ; and this is title
enough against a stranger not claiming title, for it shifts the burden
of proof.
It is then said that, if the act of the officers who destroyed the property was unauthorized, they and not the United States are liable.
But the authority of the officers is presumable from the circumstances
of the tr~nsaction. They were acting in their official capacity in the
war whic1i the country was then carrying on against the Indians, and
their purpose of destroying the property to prevent the lead and other
munitions of war from falling into the hands of the enemy was declared
at the time.
It was argued that the United States had .a right to destroy the
property, because in its position "it was dangerous with reference to
~he war and the enemy." The United States had the right to destroy
1t, but not because it was a nuisance, in its nature pernicious to everybody, and thereforo abatable by anybody, but only for the public good,
and then subject to the constitutional provision.
~t then was contended that the case shown was not one of taking
private property for public use, but " simply preventing private prope!t_y being take~ by the public enemy to be used against private
c1t1zens and agamst the government;" but this was a public use, and
the cost of it is to be borne by the public, who were benefited by it.
We think the case is within the provision of the Constitution, on which
the petitioner relies.
It was then contended that this provision of the Constitution could
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not avail the petitioner because there was no act of Congress carrying
the provision into effect; but none is necessary. 'l'he Constitution imposes on the United States the obligation of furnishing an indemnity
for the property taken, and upon that obligation an implied contract
arises, upon which, under the statute constituting this court, a claim
against the United States may be maintained here.
We are of opinion that the petitioner is entitled to recover; but he
has not produced . any evidence by which we can adjudge the value of
the property destroyed or the measure of the indemnity claimed.
The record shows that in 1838, on the petition of the petitioner, the
judge of the county of Monroe, in the Territory of Florida, appointed
appraisers to ascertain and certify to him the loss of the petitioner;
and their return, certified by the affidavit of one of them, and signed
by both, (p. 13,) was as follows:
6 tons lead .................... .......................... :......••........ : .. . $480
5 tons l{entledge .......................................................... .. 100
75
30 water casks ........... .................................................... .
75
3 anchors ................................................................... .
2 chain .cablesd..............................................................
. 300
. .
'.
.
;1
110
H u11 , sails_, an r1gg1ng .................................................. .

----

1,200

As the appraisers were the appointees of a court, and the perfor~ance cf their duty wears the fairness of a judicial procedure, this testimony may be satisfactory-, and better than any that is likely to be
obtained now. But it is not admissible, because it is not taken in due
form or on due notice, and it cannot be considered by the court nor
used against a party objecting to its use.
The depositions of the commissioners show that they never were on
board the brig and never saw the articles. They have, therefore, no
personal knowledge of their quantities.
The petitioner claims, for six tons of lead, $480.
As to this, Cooley says in his first deposition, (p. 23,) '' from the
lapse of time I am unable to particularize as to value or different articfos, but would refer the court to the answers made by me to interrogatories propounded to me soon after the burning of said brig;" and in.
his affidavit, made in 1838, (p. 7,) he testifiee that the brig was burned.
"for the purpose of preventing the Indians from procuring a quantity
oflead which was said to be in her, (six tons.) She also had on board
about five tons of kent1edge, thirty water casks, three anchors, and:
two chain cables.
This testimony as to the lead is stated as hearsay merely. As to,
the other articles, it is stated positively and as a matter of personal
knowledge, and was perhaps sufficiently definite as to quantities to
make a prima facie case.
In his deposition last taken Cooley is asked: "Did you see lead in
said vessel; and did you weigh it, or how do you know how much
there was on board?" (5th cross-inter.) He answers: "I saw a
quantity of lead in said vessel's hold. I did not weigh it. I was in-
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formed by the master that there was six or eight tons. It was in
large pigs." This answer certainly does not show any personal
knowledge as to the quantity of lead-it disclaims it.
Then the petitioner claims, for five tons of kentledge, $100.
As to this, Cooley is asked, "Did you weigh it, or how did you
ascertain the quantity of it?" He answers: "I did see kentledge
and iron cannon balls. The k~mtledge was in pigs, and in the vessel's
hold. I did not weigh it." This does not show any personal knowledge, nor any means of such knowledge; and as the question called
for a statement of such means, the implication is, he had none ; and
this indicates his affidavit before referred to was made without such
means, and impugns the reliability of that.
Then the petitioner claims, for two chain cables, $300.
, As to this, Cooley is asked, (7th cross-inter.,) '' Did you see any,
and how many, chain cables on board of said vessel; and of what size,
form, and description, and length, and weight; and how do you know
their weight?" He answers: "I saw two good chain cables, such as
suitable for the anchors. One chain and anchor was run out astern to
keep her from going further up on the shore. The anchor attached to
this chain I did not see. I do not remember their length or weight.''
Rigby says to the same question, "I saw two chain cables on board,
one of which was run out aft, as already stated. I don't recollect
their size or weight. She was a Spanish vessel, and had heavy ground
tackle.''
This is all the evidence in the case as to the length, size, or weight
of the chain cables ; and it does not prove their quantity, or furnish
any basis for their valuation.
·
'fhen the petitioner claims, for three anchors, $75.
Qooley, in his affidavit, specifies three anchors, but when asked in
his deposition last taken, (6th cross-inter.,) "Did you see any, and
how many, a,nchors on said vessel; and of what size, form, and weight
were they; and were they perfect or defective, or how otherwise?"
answers, (6th answer:) "I saw two good anchors on board; their size
and weight such as a vessel of her tonnage usually carries." And in
answer to the same question, Rigby says: "I think there were two
anchors on board; am positive there was one on the bow; also one
attached to a chain carried out aft."
Thus these two witnesses concur, when directly questioned as to the
number of anchors, in there being two anchors; and this testimony
certainly tends to show there were only two, while the return of the
commissioners specifies three anchors, and gives $75 as the valuation
of the three. Cooley, in his affidavit, also specifies three anchors; so
that, in this respect, that affidavit is impugnecl in accuracy by the extracts from the depositions above stated. As the whole testimony
l~aves the number of anchors in doubt, the valuation of the commiss10ners cannot be adopted.
.
The petitioner claims also, for hull, sails, and rigging, $110.
Cooley is asked, (3d cross-inter.,) ''Were there any sails or rigging
on said vessel; and if so, how many sails and what rigging?" and he
answers: "There were all her sails and rigging there, beside a suit of
Rep. C. C. 259-2
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spare sails, which I brought to K ey West. ' ' But in his affidavit he
says : "Her sails and rigging, or most of them, and about four hundred pounds of lead, were brought to K ey West.'' On this evidence
the quantity, as to the sails, cannot be ascertained, and there is no
other evidence in relation to it. Then the sails, rigging, and hull are
put into one valuation by the commissioners, and it cannot be told what
part of that was applied to the sails.
Then the petitioner claims, for thirty water casks, $75.
Tbis is the precise number stated in Cooley's affidavit; but we think
the examination we have above made of this document shows that it
cannot be relied on as stating quantities on personal knowledge; and
both Cooley and Rigby state in their depositions that they cannot now
specify the number of casks; and Rigby testifies they were in the hold
of the vessel, and Cooley testifies that some were on deck, but most of
them were in the hold.
On the whole case we find that the evidence does not establish the
quantities claimed nor any quantities, and this must be done, and by
witnesses testifying on their personal knowledge; and until it is done
there is nothing to which to apply the valuation of the commissioners,
which is all their testimony can tend to establish.
We are of opinion that the petitioner does not show the amount of
relief to which he is entitled by testimony on which this court can act.
This is the result of a strict application of that rule of evidence which
requites that witnesses should state facts on their personal knowledge;
but this rule cannot be di~pensed with by a court of law or equity;
whatever may be the actual merits of the case before it.
The evidence proves clearly that the property of the petitioner was
destroyed by the United States and "taken for public use," and that
his application for relief has been pending in Congress till proof of it
has been lost by the death or forgetfulness of witnesses, is probable.
And the course of the petitioner in Florida, in applying to a court of
the United States for commissioners to ascertain his loss, indicates a
fair purpose on his part, and the report of the commissioners, (one of
them the collector of the port and the other a merchant in the place,)
acting offi~ially as officers of the court-taking testimony under oath
near the time and on the spot-might well, if admissible, have great
weight, and there is nothing in the evidence to impugn its fairness ;
but, for the reasons stated above, it is not efficient evidence here.

